Files\\2018 Case Study\\CS3\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2017 National Security Strategy - § 4 references coded [ 0.24% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.06% Coverage

In addition, many actors have become skilled at operating below the threshold of military conflict—challenging the United States, our allies, and our partners with hostile actions cloaked in deniability .

Reference 2 - 0.05% Coverage

In addition, adversaries and competitors became adept at operating below the threshold of open military conflict and at the edges of international law.

Reference 3 - 0.08% Coverage

The Department of Defense must develop new operational concepts and capabilities to win without assured dominance in air, maritime, land, space, and cyberspace domains,   
including against   
those operating below the level of conventional military con-

Reference 4 - 0.05% Coverage

e IC, as well as the law enforcement community , offer unique abilities to defend against and mitigate threat actors operating below the threshold of open conflict.

Files\\2018 Case Study\\CS3\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2018 DoD Cyber Strategy Summary - § 2 references coded [ 1.05% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.68% Coverage

Competitors deterred from engaging the United States and our allies in an armed conflict are using cyberspace operations to steal our technology, disrupt our government and commerce, challenge our democratic processes, and threaten our critical infrastructure.

Reference 2 - 0.37% Coverage

We will defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.

Files\\2018 Case Study\\CS3\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2018 National Cyber Strategy - § 1 reference coded [ 0.17% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.17% Coverage

We are vulnerable to peacetime cyber attacks against critical infrastructure, and the risk is growing that these countries will conduct cyber attacks against the United States during a crisis short of war.

Files\\2018 Case Study\\CS3\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2018 National Defense Strategy Summary - § 5 references coded [ 1.75% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.28% Coverage

They have increased efforts short of armed conflict by expanding coercion to new fronts, violating principles of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately blurring the lines between civil and military goals.

Reference 2 - 0.37% Coverage

Some competitors and adversaries seek to optimize their targeting of our battle networks and operational concepts, while also using other areas of competition short of open warfare to achieve their ends (e.g., information warfare, ambiguous or denied proxy operations, and subversion).

Reference 3 - 0.36% Coverage

Counter coercion and subversion. In competition short of armed conflict, revisionist powers and rogue regimes are using corruption, predatory economic practices, propaganda, political subversion, proxies, and the threat or use of military force to change facts on the ground.

Reference 4 - 0.36% Coverage

During normal day-to-day operations, the Joint Force will sustainably compete to: deter aggression in three key regions—the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East; degrade terrorist and WMD threats; and defend U.S. interests from challenges below the level of armed conflict.

Reference 5 - 0.39% Coverage

It comprises four layers: contact, blunt, surge, and homeland. These are, respectively, designed to help us compete more effectively below the level of armed conflict; delay, degrade, or deny adversary aggression; surge war-winning forces and manage conflict escalation; and defend the U.S. homeland.

Files\\2018 Case Study\\CS3\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2018 National Military Strategy Description - § 2 references coded [ 1.69% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.39% Coverage

 Compete Below the Level of Armed Conflict (With a Military Dimension)

Reference 2 - 1.30% Coverage

Consistent with the guidance laid out in the NDS, capability investments must emphasize military advantages in lethality and operational reach, while enabling the Joint Force to compete effectively below the level of armed conflict.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2022 National Defense Strategy - § 11 references coded [ 0.84% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.13% Coverage

Now and over the next two decades, we face strategic challenges stemming from complex interactions between a rapidly changing global balance of military   
capabilities; emerging   
technologies; competitor doctrines that pose new threats to the U.S. homeland and to strategic stability; an escalation of competitors’ coercive and malign activities in the “gray zone”; and transboundary challenges that impose new demands on the Joint Force and the defense enterprise.

Reference 2 - 0.09% Coverage

These include nuclear threats to the homeland and U.S. Allies and partners; long-range cruise missile threats; cyber and information operations; counterspace threats; chemical and biological weapons (CBW); undersea warfare; and extensive gray zone campaigns targeted against democracies in particular.

Reference 3 - 0.08% Coverage

Competitors’ Gray Zone Activities. Competitors now commonly seek adverse changes in the status quo using gray zone methods – coercive approaches that may fall below perceived thresholds for U.S. military action and across areas of responsibility of different parts of the U.S. Government.

Reference 4 - 0.09% Coverage

Deterring Iranian Attacks. To deter large-scale Iranian attacks on vital national security interests and partners in the region, the Department will work to increase partner capability and resilience, particularly in air and missile defense, while collaborating with partners to expose Iranian gray zone operations.

Reference 5 - 0.08% Coverage

Campaigning initiatives change the environment to the benefit of the United States and our Allies and partners, while limiting, frustrating, and disrupting competitor activities that seriously impinge on our interests, especially those carried out in the gray zone.1

Reference 6 - 0.03% Coverage

Campaigning to Gain Military Advantage, Enhance Deterrence, and Address Gray Zone Challenges.

Reference 7 - 0.04% Coverage

Competitors increasingly engage in gray zone operations at odds with international norms and below the threshold of a credible military response.

Reference 8 - 0.06% Coverage

The Department will be judicious in its use of defense resources and efforts to counter competitors’ coercive behaviors in gray zone operations, as traditional military tools may not always be the most appropriate response.

Reference 9 - 0.08% Coverage

Nevertheless, there can be an important role for campaigning to disrupt competitors’ attempts to advance their objectives through gray zone tactics, especially when integrated for maximum impact with the actions of Allies, partners, and other U.S. departments and agencies.

Reference 10 - 0.09% Coverage

The Department will also support Ally and partner efforts, in accordance with U.S. policy and international law, to address acute forms of gray zone coercion from the PRC’s campaigns to establish control over the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and disputed land borders such as with India.

Reference 11 - 0.07% Coverage

The Department will maintain its bedrock commitment to NATO collective security, working alongside Allies and partners to deter, defend, and build resilience against further Russian military aggression and acute forms of gray zone coercion.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2022 National Military Strategy - § 1 reference coded [ 0.56% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.56% Coverage

Future warfare will include advanced threats to the Homeland, elements in the Gray-Zone, and protracted conflicts in contested environments.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2022 National Security Strategy - § 2 references coded [ 0.13% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.07% Coverage

More capable competitors and new strategies of threatening behavior below and above the traditional threshold of conflict mean we cannot afford to rely solely on conventional forces and nuclear deterrence.

Reference 2 - 0.06% Coverage

Integration across the spectrum of conflict to prevent competitors from altering the status quo in ways that harm our vital interests while hovering below the threshold of armed conflict.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2023 DoD Cyber Strategy Summary - § 2 references coded [ 0.73% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.32% Coverage

The Department will also use cyberspace operations for the purpose of campaigning, undertaking actions to limit, frustrate, or disrupt adversaries’ activities below the level of armed conflict and to achieve favorable security conditions.

Reference 2 - 0.41% Coverage

The Department will use cyberspace operations to enable and empower the Joint Force. These efforts will unfold in multiple ways: through persistent campaigning below the level of armed conflict2, through cyber defense and the fostering of cyber resilience, and through support of campaign and contingency planning.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy - § 2 references coded [ 0.19% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.07% Coverage

Criminal syndicates often operate out of states that do not cooperate with U.S. law enforcement and frequently encourage, harbor, or tolerate such activities.

Reference 2 - 0.11% Coverage

To effectively constrain our adversaries and counter malicious activities below the threshold of armed conflict, we will work with our allies and partners to pair statements of condemnation with the imposition of meaningful consequences.

**Annotations**

1 Campaigning as a form of persistence.

2 First direct linkage between persistence and campaigning.